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Abstract 
This paper builds up a two-firm, two-product model, in order to analyze the effects of bundling on the competitor’s profit, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare, when the bundler is a high- or low-quality firm. There are firms A and B as well as 
independent products 1 and 2 in the market. Product 1 as the monopoly good is produced only by firm A, while vertically 
differentiated products 2 as the competing goods are produced by both firms A and B. The findings of this paper are as 
follows: When the bundling firm produces the high-quality competing product, bundling will reduce the consumer surplus 
while may increase the competitor’s profit and social welfare. On the contrary, when the bundling firm produces the low-
quality competing good, then bundling has a foreclosure effect, making the market structure turn from a duopoly to a 
monopoly, hence decreasing the competitor’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
The antitrust divisions all over the world concern the adverse effects of bundling on fair competition, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare.  However, the consumers evaluate the product and service quality levels 
of different firms differently.  The welfare effects of bundling under homogeneous product competition may 
not apply to those of bundling under vertically differentiated product competition. 
Take the bundling sales of the Total Petroleum Company as an example: The VAB Company in Belgium 
accused the Total Company as a leading firm in oil markets of bundling gasoline products and road emergency 
rescue service, hence violating the law of Belgium to prohibit bundled sales. Belgian laws consider bundling 
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as a measure damaging consumer surplus and violating competition principles. However, on April 23, 2009, 
the European Court found that Belgium’s prohibition of bundling being against the EU law and competition 
mechanism of the free market, and hence European Court was against any uniform regulation of any member 
country on any bundled product sales (van Engelen, 2010). 
The trustbuster divisions all over the world concern the adverse effects of bundling on fair competition, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare. However, the consumers evaluate the product and service quality levels 
of different firms differently. The welfare effects of bundling under homogeneous product competition may 
not apply to those of bundling under vertically differentiated product competition. Therefore, this paper will 
analyze the effects of bundling on the competitor’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare under 
vertically differentiated product competition.  Moreover, antitrust policy implications will also be derived and 
discussed. 
Early literature mainly discusses the bundling behavior of a monopoly, including Adams and Yellen, 1976, 
Telser, 1979, Pierce and Winter, 1996, etc. The motivation for a monopoly to bundle consists of price 
differentiation in order to exploit consumer surplus and hence increase its own profit. Later a lot of economists 
relax the assumption on market structure and explore the incentive to bundle and its welfare effects. They 
usually assume two kinds of products: One product market is a monopoly while the other is a duopoly - for 
example, Carbajo et al., 1990, Whinston, 1990, Martin, 1999, Choi, 2004, and Peitz, 2008. The motivations of 
bundling include enhancing product differentiation, entry deterrence, monopoly power extension, and 
reduction in the competitor’s R&D level. 
More recent literature has incorporated vertically differentiated products with different quality levels into 
the bundling model, such as Diallo, 2006, Kovac, 2007, Gilbert and Riordan, 2007, Kramer, 2009, Banciu et 
al., 2010, Brito and Vasconcelos, 2011, and Avenali et al., 2011. Gilbert and Riordan, 2007 establish a two-
firm, two-system-product model. They assume identical consumer preferences toward quality levels.  The 
vertically integrated firm is a monopoly of a factor for the system product and its competitor has to buy this 
monopolized factor from it. These two firms engage in R&D to improve the quality levels. The vertically 
integrated firm decides whether or not to bundle. This paper assumes that a bundling can lower the 
competitor’s quality level. As a result, bundling system products will induce the competitor to exit the market, 
reduce the consumer surplus as well as social welfare. 
Kramer, 2009 assumes that consumers have different preferences toward quality of same product, the 
monopoly as well as competing good markets can both be uncovered in equilibrium, and two firms decide 
their own quality sequentially. He finds that if the sum of quality levels provided by the bundling firm is 
greater than the quality of its competitor’s product, the bundling will promote the quality of the bundling firm 
while lower the quality of its competitor; otherwise, there is no equilibrium quality under bundling while the 
bundling firm has an incentive to produce high quality products.  
This paper will adopt a two-firm model with vertical product differentiation in which the two firms engage 
in price competition in product 2, in order to analyze the effects of bundling on the competitor’s profit, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare. The bundling discussed in this paper is a tool to extend the monopoly 
power from one market to another, which is different from those to strategically reduce the competitor’s 
quality such as Gilbert and Riordan, 2007. This paper finds that when the bundling firm is the high quality 
firm, bundling will reduce the consumer surplus while may increase the competitor’s profit as well as the 
social welfare. Our result is different from Gilbert and Riordan, 2007. When the bundling firm is a low quality 
firm, bundling will compel the competitor to exit the market and turn the market structure from a duopoly to a 
monopoly, making the competitor’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare all drop. 
This paper is organized as follows: Following this introduction, Section 2 is the basic model which 
discussed the market demand functions for high- and low-quality goods without or with bundling, when 
products 1 and 2 are independent. Sections 3 and 4 analyze, respectively, the effects of bundling on profits, 
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consumer surplus, and social welfare when the bundling firm produces high- or low-quality good. Section 5 
concludes this paper. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
There are two firms (firms A and B) and two products (products 1 and 2) in this model. Product 1 is a 
monopoly good which is produced only by firm A.  Products 2 are vertically differentiated goods which are 
produced by both firms A and B. Products 1 and 2 are mutually independent. Firm A can extend its monopoly 
power from product 1 to product 2 via bundling products 1 and 2. In order to simplify the analysis without 
losing generality, we assume that at bundling one unit of product 1 is tied to one unit of product 2. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed in a linear interval [0,1] with a length of one. All consumers can 
choose whether or not to buy exactly one unit of each kind of product and hence markets of product 1 and 2 
can both be uncovered in equilibrium. The basic utility obtained by buying one unit of any product is v . The 
market product 1 is monopolized by firm A and the net utility of a representative consumer from buying one  
unit of product 1 is 1 1 1+u v q pT  , where 1q  and 1p  are the quality and price of product 1, respectively. From  
the net utility of consuming one unit of product 1, we know that the marginal consumer is located at 
 1 11 p v qT    and hence the demand function for product 1 is 1 11x T  . 
Assume that firms A and B produce vertically differentiated products 2. The quality level of firm i’s 
product 2 is 2iq , ,i A B . Consumers have heterogeneous preferences toward the quality of product 2.  Denote  
the preference level toward quality of a consumer by T  where T  is uniformly distributed over the interval 
[0,1]. We further assume that the net utility for a consumer to buy the product 2 from firm i  is 
2 2 2i i iu v q pT   , ,i A B , where 2ip  is the price of product 2 produced by firm i. Using the net utility of 
buying one unit of product 2, we know that the marginal consumer who feels indifferent between buying or 
not buying product 2 from firm B (i.e., B2) is located at  2 2B BB p v qT   . Similarly, the marginal consumer 
who feels indifferent between buying and not buying product 2 from firm A (i.e., A2) is located at 
 2 2A A Ap v qT   . In addition, the marginal consumer who feels indifferent between buying A2 or B2 is 
located at ABT     2 2 2 2A B A Bp p q q  . Therefore, when firm A produces the high quality product 2, firms 
A’s and B’s demand functions in product 2 are, respectively, 2
H
Ax 1 ABT   and 2LB AB Bx T T  ; otherwise, they 
will be, respectively, 2 1
H
B ABx T   and 2LA AB Ax T T  . 
Moreover, in order to distinguish from the case without bundling, denote Hx  and Lx  as the quantities of 
high and low quality products and p  and 2Bp  as the prices of bundled product and firm B’s product 2, 
respectively.  The net utility for consumer T to buy the bundled product is 2Au v   1 2Aq q pT    while the 
net utility for her to buy product B2 is 2 2B B Bu v q pT   . Therefore, under bundling the marginal consumer 
who feels indifferent between buying or not buying product B2 is located at  2 2B B Bp v qT   . Under 
bundling the marginal consumer who feels indifferent between buying or not buying the bundled product is 
located at
   22A Ap v qT   . The marginal consumer who feels indifferent between buying the bundled 
product and B2 is located at ABT     2 2 2B A Bp p v q q   . As a result, under bundling and firm A as the high 
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(low) quality firm, the demand functions for high and low quality products are 1HA ABx T   and LB AB Bx T T  , 
respectively; otherwise, they will be 1HB ABx T   and 
L
A AB Ax T T  . The marginal cost for firm A to produce 
product 1 is  1 1c q q . The marginal cost for firm i  to produce product 2 is  2 2i i ic q q , ,i A B . Therefore, 
increasing the product quality will increase the marginal cost of a product at a fixed rate of one. 
Based on the above model settings, this paper builds up a two-stage game in which firm A can be either the 
high- or low-quality firm. The game structure is as follows: In stage one firm A decides whether or not to 
bundle its products 1 and 2.  In stage two these two firms engage in price competition. The solution concept of 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is applied to solve this game. Therefore, the backward induction 
will be used to find the SPNE outcome. Sections 3 and 4 further consider the cases when firm A is a high- or 
low-quality firm. 
3. Firm A as a High-quality Producer 
3.1. Equilibria without bundling 
This subsection will analyze the equilibrium outcomes without bundling when firm A produces a high 
quality product 2 and firm B produces a low quality product 2; that is, 2 2A Bq q! . The notations HAS  and LBS  
denote the profits of firms A and B without bundling when products 1 and 2 are sold separately. The profit 
functions of high-quality firm A and low-quality firm B without bundling can be expressed as: 
^ `    1 1 1 2 2 21 2,
H H
A A A A
A
Max p q x p q x
p p
S                                                                                                      (1.1) 
^ `  2 2 22
L L
B B B B
B
Max p q x
p
S                                                                                                                        (1.2) 
The first-order conditions of profit maximization are: 
1 1
1 1
2 2 0
H
Ad v q p
dp q
S                                                                                                                                   (2.1) 
 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
0
H
A A B BA
A A B
q p q pd
dp q q
S                                                                                                                   (2.2) 
   
 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
2
0
L
A B B A A B AB
B B A B
v q q q p q p qd
dp q q q
S                                                                             (2.3) 
The equilibrium prices can be obtained by using Eq. (2). Substituting equilibrium prices into the demand 
functions, we find equilibrium quantities to be 1 12x v q ,  2 2 24HA A Bx v q q  , and  2LBx   2 22 4 2A Bvq q qA   2Bq . In order to ensure the total output quantities for two markets are not more than one, the following two conditions are needed: (1) 1 12 0v qD     and (2)    2 2 2 2 22 4 2A B B Av q q q q qBD      0! . 
3.2. Equilibrium with Bundling 
This paper assumes that bundling will not change the marginal costs as well as consumer preferences 
toward product quality.  In order to distinguish the equilbria with and without bundling, the notation ̚ 
denotes the results under bundling.  The profit functions under bundling are: 
^ `  1 2
H H
A AAMax p q q x
p
S                                                                                                                             (3.1) 
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^ `  2 22
L L
B BB B
B
Max p q x
p
S                                                                                                                           (3.2) 
The first-order conditions of profit maximization with bundling are: 
 1 2 2 2
1 2 2
2 2
0
H
A A B B
A B
v q q q p pd
dp q q q
S          ,                                                                                                  
(4.1) 
    
 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 22 2 1 2 2
2 2
0.
L
B A B B B A B
B B A B
v q q q p q q q pqd
dp q q q q
S                                                                                
(4.2) 
In order to analyze the change in the price of firm A’s product 2 with and without bundling, we re-express 
the best response functions in Eqs. (2.2) and (4.1) as  2 2A Bp pI    2 2 22 2B A Bp q q   and p  2BpI 2Bpª ¬   2 21 2 2v q q qA B    º¼ . Following Choi, 2004, we define the fictitious price of product A2 as the best 
response function in pricing the bundled products minus the monopoly price. Applying the fictitious price for 
firm A to produce product A2, 2 1Ap p p  , we can derive firm A’s best response function in product 2 as:        2 1 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 .B B A B BAp p v q p q q pI I                                                                            (5) 
From Eq. (5), we know that given the price of product 2 of firm B, firm A will bundle its products such that 
the best response function in product A2 remains unchanged. 
Comparing Eqs. (2.3) and (4.2), we obtain the change in firm B’s best response function with respect to 
firm A’s bundling behavior: 
       2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 22 4B B A B A A A A Ap p p p q q v q p vq q q q     ª º¬ ¼ .                                                               (6) 
Eq. (6) tells that when the quality level of product 1 is sufficiently high (low), bundling shifts firm B’s best 
response curve upward (downward). Consequently, the effects of bundling on these firms’ prices are 
indeterminate. 
The conditions for product B2 being strictly positive and the total output quantities of two markets being 
not more than one are, respectively:  3 1 2 22 3 0A Bq q qD    !  and 4D   1 2 22 4 A BBq q q qª º ¬ ¼  1 2 22 A Bv q q q    
0! . 
In order to analyze the effect of quality difference in products 2 on firm A bundling, we simplify the high  
quality level of product 2 to be one and hence 2Bq  can also measure the quality difference (i.e., 2 1Aq   and 
> 2 0,1Bq  ). Denote HA'3  as the profit difference for firm A with and without bundling, which can be 
expressed as 
      
    
1 2 21 1 1 2 2
2
1
2 2
1 1 2 1 2 2
Profit difference in product 1 Profit difference in product 2
.
4 4 1 4
H H H H H H H
A A A AA A A
H
A A A
B B B
p q x x p p q x p q x
v
q q q q q q
S S
O
      ª º'3          ¬ ¼
     
                   
(7) 
The 1O  function implies that when  2 2 1ˆB Bq q q , 0HA'3   must hold. In order to examine whether or not 
under bundling the quantities are strictly positive and the total output in a market is no more than one, we 
assume that the basic utility for a consumer to buy one unit of product is v = 0.5  and depict the conditions in 
Figure 1. Function 1D  implies that  @1 0.25,1q  . Consequently, the regime of bundling in Figure is  @1 0.25,1q   > 2 0,1Bqu   as the shadow area. The lines aa , bb , cc , and ad  are where functions  2 1ˆBq q , 2D , 3D , and 4D  
equal zero, respectively. As Figure 1 shows, in the shadow area where firm A bundles its products, the 
conditions to ensure a duopoly and the total output being no more than one in product market 2 must both 
hold. This result is summarized in Proposition 1. 
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Proposition 1.  Suppose that firm A produces the high quality product.  If  12 2ˆB Bq q q! , then bundling is a 
 dominant strategy for firm A.  Moreover, as the quality of monopoly product gets higher or the quality 
 difference in competing products gets lower, firm A has a higher incentive to bundle. 
 
First, let us discuss the effects of bundling on prices and quantities of products when bundling is a dominant 
 
Fig. 1. The regime for bundling to be a dominant strategy for firm A which is the high quality firm 
strategy for  firm A.  Define HTp p '    21 HAp p  ,  2 22 L LB BBp p p '   ,  1 HAx x '  1x ǃ 2H H HA A Ax x x '   ,  and 
2
L L L
B B Bx x x
 '    as changes in prices and quantities of products 1, 2A, and 2B.  As Eqs (5) and (6) show, when 
bundling is a dominant strategy of firm A, its best response function in price is not affected by bundling while 
firm B’s best response function will be shifted up by firm A’s bundling.  As a result, bundling increases all  
product prices; i.e.,    ˆ ˆ2 2 1 2 2 12 2 0q q q q q qB B B BT Bp p! !'  ' ! . Moreover, bundling makes the location of marginal  
consumer who feels indifferent between buying or not buying the low quality product shift to the right while 
the location of marginal consumer who feels indifferent between buying product A2 or B2 shift to the left.  
Therefore, bundling increases the sales of product A2 while decreases the sales of product B2, but its effect on 
 the sales of monopoly product is indeterminate, i.e.,  ˆ2 2 11 0q q qB Bx !
!'  ,  ˆ2 2 1 0
H
A q q qB B
x !' ! , and  ˆ2 2 1 0
L
B q q qB B
x !'  . 
Summing up the above analysis, firm A’s bundling always increases its own profit from product A2 while 
has an ambiguous effect on its own profit from the monopoly product.  The direction of effect of bundling on 
firm A’s profit from the monopoly product depends on the degree of vertical quality differentiation:  When the 
quality difference is sufficiently large (small), the profit from the monopoly profit will increase (decrease).  
Consequently, when the product difference is sufficiently large (i.e.,  2 2 1ˆB Bq q q! ), bundling is a dominant 
strategy of firm A. 
As the quality level of the monopoly product gets higher or product quality difference gets lower (i.e., 2Bq  
gets higher), the price increase made by bundling gets higher.  Moreover, an increase in quality of the 
monopoly product reduces the increase in quantity of product A2 caused by bundling while expands the 
decrease in quantity of product B2 caused by bundling.  Meanwhile, as the quality difference in competing 
products gets smaller, it expands both of the magnitudes of increase in quantity of product A2 and decrease in 
quantity of product B2.  The above discussion shows that the incentive for firm A to bundle gets higher as the 
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monopoly product’s quality gets higher or quality difference in competing products gets smaller.  Lemma 1 
summarizes the changes in equilibrium prices and quantities before and after bundling: 
 
Lemma 1.  If the bundling firm is the high quality firm, then bundling has an ambiguous effect on the quantity 
of monopoly product while increases the quantity of product A2; and the price of bundled products is higher 
than the sum of prices of unbundled products.  For its low quality competitor, bundling increases the price 
while decreases the quantity of product B2. 
 
Fig. 2. The effects of bundling on the competitor’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare when the bundling firm is high quality  
firm 
3.3. Profits and Social Welfare before and after Bundling 
This subsection further analyzes the effects of bundling on its competitor’s profit, consumer surplus, and 
social welfare. Define     22 2 2 2L L L L LB B B B BB B B Bp q x p q xS S'3        as the change in firm B’s profit before and 
after bundling. Substituting the equilibrium outcomes into firm B’s profit function, we have 2 2 14LB v qO'3   
  2 22 24 4B Bq q    1 21 Bq q  ; moreover, if  12 2B Bq q q! , then 0LB !'3 . 
Summing up the consumer surpluses from buying the monopoly product and high and low quality 
 competing products without bundling, we obtain 1cs cs  2 2A Bcs cs   11 1 1v q p dT T T  ³  1 2 2AB A Av q p dT T T ³
 
 2 2ABB B Bv q p dTT T T  ³ .  S i mi l a r l y ,  u n d e r  b u nd l i n g  t h e  c o n s u me r  s u r p l u s  i s  cs  Acs + Bcs  
 1 1 22AB Av q q p dT T T    ª º³ ¬ ¼  2 2ABB B Bv q p dTT T T ³ . Substituting the equilibrium outcomes into cs  and cs  and  
then taking their difference, we have   1 2AA ACS cs cs cs'     and BCS'  Bcs  2Bcs . It can be shown that 
0BCS'  , 0ACS' ! , and B ACS CS' ! ' .
 Define the social welfare is the sum of firm profits and consumer surpluses.  Therefore, the social welfare  
functions before and after bundling are H LA Bw csS S    and H LA Bw S S   cs , respectively. We find 
that bundling may improve the social welfare, i.e.,  H LA BW w w'    '3 '3   22 3 1 1 28 4 4 BCS v q q qO'     
 224 Bq  1 21 Bq q  . When  2 2 1B Bq q q! , 0W !' . Figure 2 helps interpreting and Proposition 2 summarizes  
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the above results. 
 
Proposition 2.  When the bundling firm is the high quality firm, bundling always reduces the total consumer 
surplus and may increase its competitor’s profit and the social welfare. 
 
Lemma 1 implies that bundling reduces the consumer surplus in product B2, i.e., 0BCS'  . Moreover, for 
consumers who purchase products A, the effect of surplus gains due to increase the number of consumers 
dominates the surplus loss due to increasing price, hence making the consumer surplus in product A increase; 
that is, 0ACS' ! . Since B ACS CS' ! ' , bundling will reduce the total consumer surplus. Figure 2(1) also 
shows the result of consumer surplus dropping in the bundling regime. 
Similarly, Lemma 1 also tells that when the effect of price increase in product B2 dominates (is dominated 
by) that of quantity decrease, bundling makes the competitor’s profit increase (decrease). This net effect 
depends on the degree of quality differentiation. Figure 2(3) tells that when the degree of product quality 
differentiation is sufficiently small (i.e., 2 2 1B Bq q  ), bundling will increase the competitor’s profit, which 
corresponds to the shaded area. Otherwise, when the degree of quality differentiation is sufficiently large (i.e., 
2 2 2ˆB B Bq q q  ), bundling will decrease the competitor’s profit.   
The shaded area in Figure 2(3) corresponds to the situation where the degree of quality differentiation is 
sufficiently small (i.e., 2 2 1B Bq q  ) and bundling promotes the social welfare. This is because when the degree 
of quality differentiation is sufficiently small, bundling expands the magnitudes of increasing prices, increased 
quantity of product A2, and decreased quantity of product B2. However, since the magnitude of increased 
profits still dominates that of decreased consumer surplus, bundling increases the social welfare in this case. On 
the contrary, when 2 2 2ˆB B Bq q q  , bundling will instead worsen the social welfare. The above results differ 
from those in Gilbert and Riordan, 2007 in which technology bundling will compel the competitor to exit the 
market and make both consumer surplus and social welfare drop. 
4. Multi-product Firm A as a Low-quality Producer 
Comparing to Section 3, in this section we only switch the quality levels of the bundling firm and its 
competitor, keeping other things being equal. In this section the equilibrium outcomes, second-order 
conditions for profit maximization, and stability condition without bundling are exactly the same with those in 
Subsection 3.1. In order to avoid duplicate statements, only the new and important results will be presented. 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are with bundling: 
    
  1 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 2 2 1 2
2 2
0
L
A A B B B A B
A B A
v q q q p q q q pqd
dp q q q q q
S                                                                                    (8.1) 
 
 1 2 2 22 1 2 2
2 2
0
H
B A B B
B A B
q q q v p pd
dp q q q
S                                                                                                              (8.2) 
The condition for the existence of an interior solution can be obtained by using the first-order, second-
order, and stability conditions:  1 2 2 0A Bq q q   . Moreover, the high-quality firm B’s unit revenue and quantity 
are both negative if the low-quality firm A bundles, that is,    2 2 1 2 1 2 24HB B A A Bp q v q q q q q     0  and 
H
Bx v       1 2 1 2 2 1 2 24 0A A B A Bq q q q q q q q      . Via the above analysis, we know that the bundling 
behavior of a low quality firm will compel its competitor to exit the market, changing the market structure 
from a duopoly to a monopoly. The results under a low-quality firm’s bundling are summarized in Proposition 
3: 
Proposition3.  The bundling behavior by a low-quality firm compels the competitor to exit the market and 
makes the market structure of the competing products to change from a duopoly to a monopoly. 
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Proposition 3 further implies that with bundling, there are only the bundled products provided by firm A in 
the market. Using the condition 0Au   to find the marginal consumer T  who feel indifferent between buying 
or not buying the bundled products, we obtain the demand function for the bundled products as: 1x T    
   1 2 1 22A Aq q v p q q    . The optimal price of the bundled products to maximize firm A’s profit is 
1 2
M
Ap v q q
   . In order to ensure that the quantity of the bundled products to be no more than 1, the 
condition 5 1v qD    2 0Aq   is needed. The high quality level of product 2 is one as assumed previously.  The  
 
Fig. 3. The shaded area for bundling to be a dominant strategy for firm A as the low quality firm  
 
profit difference with and without bundling for firm A is:    22 4 1 2 1 2 24 4M LA A A A Av q q q q qS S O'3      . Let  2 2 1A Aq q q and then 0A'3  .  Figure 3 is drawn by using the parameter value 0.5v  and depicting 2D , 5D , 
and  2 1Aq q  on the space  @ > 1 20.25,1 0,1Aq q u  .  The shaded area in Figure 3 is where bundling is a dominant 
strategy for firm A. 
We further analyze the effects of bundling on the consumer surplus and social welfare, when the bundling 
firm is the low quality firm. Via analysis, we know that if bundling is a dominant strategy of firm A, bundling 
will unambiguously reduce consumer surplus and social welfare. 
 
Proposition 4.  If the bundling firm is a low quality firm, then bundling reduces the consumer surplus and 
social welfare. 
Substituting equilibrium outcomes with and without bundling into the consumer surplus and social welfare 
when firm A is the low quality firm, we obtain the surplus changes: MCS'  2 5 1 2 18 Av q q qO    22 2 4A Aq q   
and MW'   2 6 1 2 1 28 A Av q q q qO   22 4Aq  , where 5 0O !  and 6 0O  . 
When firm A is the low quality firm, with bundling firm A monopolizes the two markets at the same time 
meanwhile the price of the bundled products is higher the sum of prices of unbundled products 1 and A2; that 
 is,  1MT Mp p p'      2 2 2 23 2 4 0HA A B Ap vq q q   ! . Since the magnitude of decreased consumer surplus and 
 competitor profit dominates that of bundler’s profit gains, bundling by a low quality firm reduces the social 
welfare. This finding is consistent with Gilbert and Riordan, 2007 with different model settings.  Recall that 
Gilbert and Riordan, 2007 assume homogenous consumer preferences toward quality; moreover, both firms 
can engage in R&D to improve their own quality level and technology bundling can effectively reduce the 
competitor’s quality level choice. 
Our Propositions 2 and 4 support the viewpoint of the European Court on the Total Petroleum case, since 
the effects of bundling on consumer and social surplus depend on the product quality of the bundler.  As a 
result, there should be no uniform regulation on bundling and the judgment of bundling should be on a case-
by-case base (rule of reason). 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In the globalizing markets, more and more examples of bundling in order to extend a firm’s monopoly 
power keep occurring. The bundling issue also receives the attention in the antitrust sectors all over the world. 
This paper starts with the case with vertical product differentiation and shows that bundling by a high quality 
or low quality firm results in different effects on consumer surplus, competitor’s profit and social welfare. Our 
findings support the viewpoint of European Court in the Total Petroleum case that uniform regulation on 
bundling is not socially desirable. 
This paper adopts a more realistic assumption to allow consumers to have heterogeneous preferences 
toward product quality. It is found that when the bundler is the high quality firm, bundling reduces the 
consumer surplus while the changes in the competitor’s profit and social welfare depend on the degree of 
quality differentiation of the competing products. On the contrary, when the bundler is the low quality firm, 
bundling compels its competitor to exit the market, turns the market structure from a duopoly to a monopoly, 
and reduces the competitor’s profit, consumer surplus, as well as social welfare. 
According to the major findings of this paper, vertical quality differentiation is a key factor causing 
bundling to have very different effects on consumer surplus, competitor’s profit, and social welfare. Judgment 
of the welfare effects of bundling then should be on a case-by-case basis and follow the rule of reason. 
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